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Summary findings
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who are unprotected  by labor legislation and work in  He shows that traditional  earning differentials cannot
small "informal" firms.  prove or disprove segmentation in developing countries,
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A long tradition views the roughly 40% of LDC labor forces that are unprotected by labor
legislation and working in small "informal" firms to be the disadvantaged segment of a dual labor
market.'  The origins and dynamics of this sector have attracted renewed interest for at least two
reasons. First, increasing  labor market efficiency  and flexibility  is considered an essential complement
to  the market-based reforms underway throughout the developing world. 2 To  the degree that
segmentation is driven by government or union imposed regulations that induce rigidities and push
labor costs above market clearing, the large size of the informal sector stands as a measure of the
magnitude of required reforms.
Second, a related literature with a very different emphasis sees informality as the result of an
ongoing effort by large modern enterprises to evade mandated protections through subcontracting
to unprotected workers, a process accelerated by heightened global competition in labor intensive
manufactures. The existence and-behavior of the sector are thus directly  relevant to the debate over
establishing common labor standards throughout free trade agreements: whatever safeguards may be
enshrined in labor codes, LDC-based firms could employ an effectively  unprotected work force to
'See,  for  example,  Harris  and  Todaro  (1970),  Sabot  (1977),  Mazumdar(1983)  or Fields  (1990).  A  recent
World  Bank  document  argues  that  "Protected  workcers  in the  'modem'  or  'formal'  sector  ...enjoy  high wages,
social  security,  vacation,  pension  and employment  security  as mandated  by legislation.  By contrast,  those
unable  to find  work  in such  firms  resort  to the next  best  alternative,  the  so-called  'informal  sector'  in small
firms  or self-employment,  engaged  in labor-intensive  activities,  withoutjob  security  or benefits."(Ozorio  de
Almeida  et al. 1995,  p.  1). See  Fields  (1990),  Tokman  (1992),  Portes  (1994),  Rosenzweig  (1988),  Thomas
(1992)  for  excellent  overviews  of  the  informality  literature.  See  Stiglitz  (1974),  Esfahani  and  Salehi-Isfahani
(1989)  for efficiency  wage  models  of  LDC  dualism.
2 See,  for example,  World  Bank  (1995)  World  Development  Report.compete  with U.S. firms.  3
This  paper  argues  that the traditional  conflation  of issues  of  formality  and dualism  is probably
inappropriate  and offers an alternate  view of the role of the  unregulated  small  firm  sector. As in the
industrialized  countries, many workers may choose to start or work in small firms and in the
developing  country context the incentives  to do so may  be greater. First, the inefficiencies  and
rigidities  that often  accompany  labor  protections,  and  the implicit  taxation  they  imply  in the absence
of a binding  minimum  wage, may serve  to reduce the attractiveness  of formal  sector employment.
More generally,  the low level  of formal  sector  productivity  for the mass of poorly  educated  workers
in developing  countries  reduces  the opportunity  cost of  being  independently  employed.  Much of the
informal  sector may  therefore  reflect an efficient  allocation  of labor.
Despite the long tradition  and a voluminous  literature,  support for the dualistic  view is not
strong  and has rested largely  on case  studies  and  on comparisons  of earnings  across  sectors  adjusted
for observable  worker characteristics. 4 This  paper  employs  detailed  panel data from  Mexico  to take
a more comprehensive  approach than has been previously feasible. It  examines  the earnings
differentials  and mobility patterns of individual  workers transitioning among formal salaried
employment  and  three modalities  of informal  work: The  self-employed,  owners  of  informal  firms  with
or without  additional  employees;  the infonnal  salaried,  those working  for these informal  firms  and
who are usually  considered  the least advantaged  of  the work  force; and contract  workers,  those  who
do not receive  a regular  wage or salary,  but who are  paid  as a percentage,  by piece,  on commission,
3 See  Portes,  Castells  and  Benton  (1989),  Tokman  (1992).The  U.S.  Department  of  Labor  has  sponsored
two  studies  on the informal  sector. See Workers  Without  Protections:  Case  Studies  of the Informal  Sector  in
Developing  Countries  (1993)  and The  Informnl  Sector in  Mexico (1992).
4 See Rosenzweig  (1988).
2or fixed  contract and are often connected  to larger  firms.
The earnings  differentials  generated  are more precise and reliable  than those previously
generated, but are shown.*t6  be fundamentally  unable to prove or disprove  segmentation  in this
context. As an alternative,  the paper examines  the patterns of worker mobility  predicted  by the
dualism  hypothesis,  generating  both a dynamic  overview  of  movement  through  the labor  market,  and
characterizations  of the interactions  among  the four classes of work. While unable to provide
conclusive  evidence,  this approach  offers substantial  reason  to question  the dualistic  view as the
primary  explanation  for the existence  and  dynamics  ofthe  sector. The labor  market  appears  relatively
fluid  with large and symmetric  flows  of work:ers  among  all sectors. The data is consistent  with self-
employment  being a desirable  destination  for many  workers  and with contract  work being closely
related.  It also suggests  that informal  salaried  work is the entry  point and perhaps  training  area  for
young  workers  who, even  if queuing,  very quickly  leave  to take both formal  and informal  jobs.
rr. Data:
The study  employs  two sources of data  on men  aged 16-65  with a high school  education  or
less in 16 major metropolitan  areas. The National  Urban  Employment  Survey  (NUES) conducts
extensive  quarterly  interviews  and is structureid  so as to generate  panels  that allow  tracking  a fifth  of
the samnple  across  five quarters.  Workers  are  matched  by household,  role in household,  sex,  level  of
education,  and age, to ensure  against  generating  spurious  transitions.  Though  five  quarters  does  not
permit  a full description  of the life cycle  of an individual,  it is nonetheless  possible  to sketch  patterns
of mobility  among  sectors  and  to identify  worker  characteristics  that  correspond  to them.  To  generate
a sufficiently  large sample of roughly  15,000  observations,  three contiguous  NUES cohorts  were
3combined: 1990:3-1991:3, 1991:1-1992:1, 1991:2-1992:2.5
Another  panel was created spanning 1991:1-1992:1 that terminates in the more detailed
Micro-Enterprises Survey (MES).  This survey was constructed by identifying 11,000 owners of
micro-enterprises, defined as firms of fewer than six individuals, from the 1990:4 NUES  and re-
interviewing them in 1991:  1 in more depth about issues of capital structures, costs, and employment
patterns.  It also specifically  asks why they left their previous job and why they started the present
business which offer a partial alternative to naive corrections for selectivity  bias. 6 Thus, for a reduced
sample, we have far more information on both earnings differentials, and motivations for moving.
The panels in the combined NUES sample above were chosen to include and span either side of the
MES panel.
Two popular definitions of  informality are employed. The first focuses specifically on the
issue of "protectedness" and comprises owners or workers in firms of fewer than 16 employees who
; The cohort beginning  in the fourth  quarter of 1990  was not used because  it would  incorporate  the end
of the year  bonuses,  the aguinaldo.  This normally  amounts  to a 13th  monthly  payment  but may  vary  by year
and firm imparting  an undetermined  upward  bias to  the monthly  wage  reports. Since  we  are concerned  with
expected  differentials  in income,  the wages  of workers  who reported  nonnally  receiving  the aguinaldo  were
increased  by 13/12.
6Heckman  (1979)  is insistent  that the standard  two  stage  methods  of correctingfor  selectivity  bias depend
on having confidence  in the underlying  model  of how workers choose among sectors. A bad first stage
selection  specification  may  induce bias  rather  than correct  for that existing.  This  is likely  to be the case as
the premise of this work  is that we have little knowledge  of the role each sector  serves. Further, since a
principle  argument  of  this work  is that, in the absence  of knowledge  of the value  of unobservable  components
ofthe differential,  we  cannot  use  the differentials  as evidence  of segmentation,  the issue  becomes  of somewhat
less importance. The standard  Heckman procedure  was employed,  however,  for transitions in and out of
formal salaried  work  using  the variables  employed  in the logit analysis in section  IV  for the probit first stage.
The model  for Formal Salared  to Self-Employment  did not converge  and yielded  improbable  results.  For
Self-Employment  to Formal Salaried, Formal Salaried -Informal  Salaried  , Formal Salaried to Contract,
Contract-Formal  Salaried,  it could not be rejected  that the transformed  correlation  coefficient  between  the
errors in the selection  and wage equation was zero and hence the correction  for selectivity  bias was
inappropriate. Only  for  the Informal  Salaried  to  Formal Salaried  regression  was  the  transformed  correlation
coefficient  significant.  The correction  changed  the sign ofthe differential  and  greatly  changed  the magnitude.
Again, however, in the absence  of a model of what is being selected  for, it is unclear how to interpret the
restat.
4do not have social security or medical benefits.  The second addresses the issue of the role of the
small firm or  "micro-enterprise" using the Mexican government definition of firms of under six
workers. Because only the latter definition  is consistent with the sampling of the MES, it is the one
used for the joint NITES/MES  panel. However, the similarities  between the two sets of descriptive
statistics (table 1) on age, work experience, level of schooling and an index of the real wage at the
beginning of the period for each transition, confirm that there is great overlap in the composition of
the two populations and that the results are unlikely to be driven by the particular definition chosen.
Though the differences in sample means are sometimes statistically  significant,  they are never large.
This is due partly to the fact that among entrepreneurs of firms with less than six workers, only 5%
are covered by benefits and that the vast majority of micro-firms are concentrated at sizes of below
three workers.
IL  Wage Differentials as Evidence of Segmentation
Traditional efforts to identify  segmenlation  by comparing conditional  means between sectors
are unsatisfying for two reasons. First, as is well-documented in the literature, unobserved worker
characteristics that  affect productivity-- ability to tolerate authority, punctuality, entrepreneurial
ability- may also influence in which sector an individual chooses to work and bias estimates of the
sector differential.'
But a greater concern is that the specific characteristics of work that pertain to or even define
7  Recognizing  this, Marcouiller  et al. atlempt  to mitigate  the  selection  bias  but are clear about  the
limitations  of  the standard  techniques  when  there  is no  clear  consensus  about  how  workers  sort  themselves
between  the  informal  and  formal  sector.  They,  in the end,  report  higher  earnings  in the  informal  sector.
5the formal and informal sectors affect the earnings  paid in each sector and make it unclear what the
magnitude or sign of the differential should be even in an unsegmented market.  Informal earnings
should exceed formal sector wages by the expected  value of unreceived benefits, and fall below them
by the taxation that is often evaded.  Earnings both in contract and self-employment  may reflect a
premium for risk, lifestyle, and in the latter case, the implicit costs of capital invested, and the value
of unpaid work by family members that the MES suggests comprise 34% of micro-firm employees.
Informal salaried workers are among the youngest (table 1) and the MES reports that roughly 30%
are related to their employer. Their reported earnings  may therefore  incorporate training costs (see
Hemmer and Mannel, 1989 and Roberts, 1989) or unobserved payments in kind.
i. Estimates of earnings differentials
Using the vast  but  undetailed NTJES, the first columns of tables  2a  and 2b  show the
percentage change in hourly real earnings generated by movements of individuals among sectors.
This holds worker characteristics  constant and leaves  the variations in the characteristics ofthe work
itself as the residual  explanatory factor. The next columns  account for these characteristics  more than
has been possible previously and present changes in real wages net of taxes,' and real wages net of
taxes  per  hour  among the  four  sectors. 9 For  all three- transitions  into  self-employment,  the
s Payments  were  calculated  based  on  the Mexican  tax  tables.  It was  assumed  that all informal  workers
avoided  paying taxes  and all formal workers  paid.
9The non-normality  of the distributions  makes  the sample  mean an inadequate  measure  of the central
tendency  of  the data  and  its significance.  Two  alternate  measures  are  presented  in each  column:  the  mean  as
determined  by a robust  estimation  technique,  and  the  median.  The  median  is largely  unaffected  by the  non-
normality  of the distribution  and is robust  to outliers. The robust  mean attempts  to recover  the information
in the tails while compensating  to some extent  for outliers  and non-normality.  All calculations  are done in
STATA.
6NUES/MES  panel allows further adjustment for imputed return on the value of capital (tools,
inventories, and location if owned), and hours worked by unpaid workers (table 3).10
The results would appear to invert the conventional  view of the relation  between formal and
informal sectors, regardless of the definition  chosen: movement into formal salaried employment is
associated with a significant decline in remuneration, except from informal salaried employment;
movement from formal salaried employment always  leads to a significant  increase. However, in the
absence of information on the value of benefits, compensation for risk, the value of independence,
or in-kind payments or implicit training costs, the magnitude  of the distortion-free differential cannot
be known ex-ante, and neither these, nor any previous reported sectoral differentials are reliable
measures of segmentation.  Further, though table 3 suggests  that those reporting voluntary moves into
self-employment do far better  than those moving involuntarily, we cannot necessarily interpret
asymmetries in differentials in tables 2a and b as evidence that there is a larger component of
voluntary movement into the formal salaried sector:  Involuntary  separations due to formal sector firm
closures imply the loss of well paying jobs and a large differential,  while the analogous failure of a
micro-enterprise may imply low earnings prior to transition and a smaller differential.
However, the differentials among informal sectors are less affected by unobservables, such
as the loss of formal sector benefits, and are suggestive of similarities and differences among them.
10 Despite  choosing  the NUES  sample  to straddle  the  MES  sample,  predictably,  the  raw  differentials
differ  somewhat.  For  the critical  salaried  formal  salaried/self-employed  transition  they  are  extremely  close.
For  the other  cases,  although  we are dealing  with the  same  relative  orders  of magnitude,  it is less  easy  to
consider  these simply  as adjustments  to the NiJES  results reported  above.  The formal/self-employed
differential  is slightly,  although  not significantly  higher  (11,5  vs 9,4) and the contract/self-employed
differential  is  also  broadly  similar  (10,-i  vs  7, 8)  with  a substtial but  insignificant  difference  in the  median.
The  differential  from  informal/  salaried  employment  is  substantially  higher  (33,25  vs 19,16)  and significant
different.
7Tables 2a and b show that movement into self-employment  is always associated with a substantial and
significant  rise in per hour after-tax remuneration from every other sector, reaching over 25% from
the fornal  and informal  salaried sectors.  However, the joint NUES/MES panel (table 3) shows that
after modest adjustments for capital costs, and much larger ones for unpaid labor,"' both contract
work and self-employment share simrilar  premia with respect to formal salaried and informal salaried
work, and the differential between them is insignificant. Contract  work appears similar to  self-
employment and may therefore share the same composition of voluntary and involuntary entrants.
Salaried informal employment, however, suffers a discount  relative to all other sectors.  After
adjusting the differentials  for standard  firm size effects observed in the U.S.," 2 moving to an informal
sector firm from a comparably-sized formal sector firm now yields a 12-15% rise in the "micro-
enterprise" sample, comparable to those above, but only a slight rise in the "unprotected" sample.
Further, the large asymmetries in both cases suggest that informal salaried workers gain far more
entering salaried formal work than they lose leaving, as would be predicted if they were queuing for
11  A return  of 10%  was  imputed.  Most  micro-enterprises  who  save  in commercial  accounts  or cajas  de
ahorro  received  3%  real.  Implicitly  we  are  assuming  7%  for  depreciation.  The  low  level  of  capital  employed
results  in the overall  differential  being relatively  insensitive  to the cost  of capital value chosen. The more
detailed  treatment  of taxation  in the MS allows  dropping  the  previous  assumption  of  complete  avoidance
by  the self-employed  and  induces  a slight  moderation  in the  after-tax  differential.  The  adjustment  for  unpaid
labor  may  be overstated  if Balan  et al are  correct  that  "Since  in most  cases  these  family  members  would  not
otherwise  be employed  outside  the household,  their contribution  to  family  finances  is a 'net' one..."(p.218)  or
if the unpaid labor  was in training.
12  The  wage/size  elasticities  were  taken from  Barron  et  al's (1987)  U.S. study  which  estimates  the
impact  net of  unionization  effects  and  capital-labor  ratios  in a society  where  labor  laws  are enforced  across
size.  A simple  regression  of  the  log  of  the  wage  on the  log  of  firm  size  yields  coefficients  on  the  order  of .042
to .069  and very  significant,  roughly  double  the 2.8%  found  by Barron  et al..  Behar  (1988)  and Ros  and
Marquez  (1990)  find that in Mexico,  as others  have  found  elsewhere,  wages  increase  with  firm  size and
urther,  large  firms  often  pay  benefits  substantially  above  those  established  by  law.  Because  we  cannot  control
for capital-labor  ratios and  unionization,  and  because  this  size  effect  may  reflect  the very  fact  that the infornal
in small  firms  are  rationed  out  of larger  firms  by  excessive  wage  legislation,  including  a change  in firm  size
variable  in the  differential  regressions  might  obscure  the  very  effect  to be measured.
8formal  salaried  jobs. On the other hand,  this asymmetry  also exists  with the contract sector so it is
not limited to entering  formal employment.  Further, should deductions  for training costs be a
substantial  fraction  of the wage,  such  an asym;metry  would  be expected  since  returning  workers may
not work  as apprentices.  More  fundamentally,  the discount  with respect  to the other  informal  sectors
suggests  that the composition  of the premium  in the absence  of distortions  is distinct  for this  sector.
This might be the case,  for example,  if the premium  for risk is lower, if the 30% of the informal
salaried  who are related  to the owner  receive  a large  fraction  of their  income  in kind,  or if training
costs are substantial.
ii. Are the differentials  consistent  with an integrated  labor market?
Though  we cannot  credibly  prove or disprove  segmentation  based  on these differentials,  we
can ask whether  they seem  plausibly  consistent  with an absence  of segrnentation:  If the responses  of
those reporting voluntary  moves are reliable,  is the 15-20%  differential  plausibly  large enough to
cover  the value of benefits  (which,  on paper  constitute  between  31-60%  of the wage), some  return
to risk, and  whatever  value  is placed  on one styl[e  of work  vs another?  The breakdown  by motivation
in table 3 could, in theory, offer some  measure of the value of the latter but the differential  for
"independence"  does  not  vary  significantly  from  that  for "higher  pay"  and,  depending  on the question,
implies  contradictory  signs  on the premium." 3 If'we  interpret  this ambiguity  as implying  a small  effect,
and the risk premium  is positive,  these leave  the value of benefits  even  smaller--  a half or even a
quarter of those on paper.
Three factors  make this  plausible  and suggest  a reason  why  the attraction  of formal sector
13 World  Bank  estimates.  See  also  Davila-Capalleja(1996)
9employment  may have been overstated. First, since  the medical  benefits  program in Mexico, as
elsewhere,  covers  a worker's entire  family,  the  marginal  value  of benefits  to the second  formal  sector
worker in a family  is zero. Second,  administrative  overhead  costs are high and the benefits  may  be
of low value given  their cost. In his interviews  with Guadalajaran  workers,  Roberts (1989,  p. 50)
found that "many informants  cited the deduction  made for welfare as a disadvantage  of formal
employment,  particularly  since  the services  they  received  were poor." Third,  rapid  rates of turnover
mean  that leaving  does not necessarily  imply  the loss of nominally  very generous  separation  benefits
and pensions  since  as Balan et. al (1973,  p. 212)  found in their extensive  surveys  of worker career
trajectories  in Monterrey,  "many  change  enterprises  quite  often  and  thus they  cannot  benefit  from  the
seniority  accumulated  in each of them." In each  case,  the value  to workers of formal  sector  benefits
is below their value on paper, and what, in the absence  of a binding  minimum  wage, workers
implicitly  pay.' 4
In sum, earning  differentials  do not offer compelling  evidence  in favor of the segmentation
hypothesis  in Mexico  and, given  the difficulty  of quantifying  the unobservables,  are unlikely  ever  to
be convincing  tests.
IV. Patterns of Mobility
In contrast,  the patterns  of worker  transitions  can offer  additional  information  on the  validity
of the dualistic  view. Ideally,  a model  of  the behavior  for each of the four sectors and workers'
choices  to enter them would  be postulated  and  held  up against  the evidence.  However,  this is a vast
"Bell  (1994)  argues  that  the  minimum  wage  has  virtually  no  impact  on the  distribution  of  average  wages
reported  by firms  in Mexico  and little evidence  of non-compliance  since  few  firms  paid  wages  below  the
10research agenda  in itself  and the present  paper  seeks  only  to develop  a few  provocative  stylized  facts
about the dynamics  ofthe market  and  sketch  some  characterizations  ofthe nature  and  the interaction
of the sectors.
To begin,  the dualistic  view predicts  some:  general  patterns  should  be evident. If formal  sector
work is preferred  to informal  work, we would  expect  that workers  would  queue  up for formal  sector
jobs and  relinquish  them only  under  the limited  conditiontpermitted  by the Constitution--  egregious
conduct or "acts of god" that induce  firm  downsizing."  This should  imply:
i.  Very low rates of formal  sector  turnover.
ii. A largely  unidirectional  flow of workers  who  graduate  from the informal  sector into the
formal sector where they stay until retirement.  Flows in the other direction should be largely
involuntary  and in relatively  prosperous  times,  far less. At the time of this sample,  the Mexican
economy  was growing  and since 1989,  unemployment  had been at decadal  lows  of around 2.6%.
iii. Given  a probability  of being selected  from  the queue  in each time  period,  the probability
of entry  into formal  salaried  work should  be an increasing  function  of experience.
This section tests for these patterns in two ways: First, for each definition  of informality,
Matrices 1 and 2 provide  summary  data on transitions  among  sectors  by tabulating  the conditional
probability  of finding  a worker in sector  j at the end of the period (columns)  given  that the worker
began  in sector i at the beginning  (rows),  P 1.1 6 The row percentages  sum  to 100%  and the totals at
/~~~~
15  The Constitution  conceives  of the employment  relationship  as a lifetime  contract  and workers  may only
be fired under extreme  circumstances  and at great cost
16 In a spirit similar  to the work  at hand, Sedlacek  et. al.(1995)  studied  the mobility  of  Brazilian  workers
with and without  signed  working cards, and hence  worker  projections,  and found little evidence of strong
barriers to mobility.
11the bottom represent  the share  of the workers  to be found  in each category  at the end of the period
P j. The first three columns  and rows represent  individuals  who are not working:  those out of the
labor  force (OLF), not currently  working  and not searching;  those studying;  and those looking  for
work, the unemployed.  The bold rectangle  borders five categories  of work beginning  with unpaid
labor and the shaded  area comprises  the paid  jobs described  earlier  which  are our chief  focus.
Since  in a random  shuffling  of workers, P 1 u would  clearly  increase  with Pj the second panel
of the matrix  standardizes  the transition  probabilities  by terminal  sector size,  Pi/Pj. Though  this is a
better  measure  of fluidity  among  sectors,  it is an imperfect  measure  of ease  of entry  since  a low  desire
to leave  the initial  sector will  yield  a low  value as well  as a distortion  induced  low level of turnover
in the terminal  sector:
PY/PJ  =  (1  - Pd )Vr(1 - P.)
Vc,  tabulated in the third panel, captures the disposition  or economic  or institutional logic that
compels a worker leaving  the initial  sector  to enter an open position  in  j: e.g. though  both third and
fourth  grade  elementary  school  classes  may  fully  turnover  every  year,  we would  expect  V to be large
for transitions  in the ascending  direction  and  zero in the reverse. In the present  case,  the disposition
to enter paid  employment  from school  is two to three times  that of the reverse  transitions  as would
be expected  if  workers  generally  graduate  from school  to employment.  Ifthe dualism  hypothesis  that
workers graduate from informal  to  formal employment is correct, we should expect similar
asymmetric  Vs between  the sectors.
Further  characterization  of the patterns  of mobility  is offered  by a multinomial  logit  model  of
12sector choice  that includes  experience,  experience  squared,  and  schooling.  Since  these  are  often  the
factors  included  in Mincerian  earnings  equations,  the initial  period  real  wage  is included  to ensure  that
it is not simply  the wage  effect  that  is reflected,  The coefficients  in tables  4a and  b are those  from the
standard  exponential  form
where  the vector  fj measures  the degree  to which  an  increase  in worker  characteristic  X increases  the
probability  of a worker going  to sector  j relative  to the probability  of staying  in sector i.  In the
second  half of each  panel  are presented  the dummy  and  interactive  effects  of involuntary  separation
from  the  previous  job, tabulated  in the relatively  infrequent  case  of a spell  of unemployment  between
jobs. In only  four cases  does  the likelihood  ratio confirm  the significance  of these terms as a block
(at the 10% level),  but in no case does their inclusion  cause a substantial  alteration  of the initial
parameters.  Again,  with few exceptions,  the results  for the two samples  are very similar.
Together,  these first offer a view of overall  labor  force  dynamics  and then of how the four sectors
interact.
I. Overview  of the Labor  Market
Three important  general  findings  are immediately  apparent. First, the matrices  reveal  high
levels of mobility  with turnover  rates (and implicitly  the length  of tenure at 5.21-5.7  years)  in the
formal  sector similar  to those in the U.S..'7 There  appears  little evidence  of the rigidities  that the
17  MediantenureforaU  workers  over  16  years old in 1991  was 5.1 years.  BLS NEWS,  USDL  92-386.  The
implicit  tenure  based  on  turnover  rates  on  mean  Juily/August  1994  median  separation  rate  of 1.  1%/month  was
7.6 years. Bureau  of National  Affairs,  Bulletin to  Management, Dec. 8, 1994. Mean  tenure calculated  as
13incentives  in the labor code  would lead  us to expect. Second,  the symmetry  of Vs across  directions
of movement  in all sectors of paid  work seems  more consistent  with a well-integrated  market  where
workers  search  across  sectors  forjob opportunities,  than  one  where  informal  workers  seekpermanent
status  in the formal  sector  and stay  until  they  retire." Finally,  the logit results  show  that in no sector
does  the probability  of moving  into the formal  sector  relative  to staying  increase  in overall  experience
as would  be expected  if there were queuing  to enter the sector. 19
«ITanlow5  hereŽ
ii. Self-Employment  as an Alternative  to Formal  Sector  Employment
Self-employment  constitutes  the largest  source  of employment  (25%), after formal  salaried
employment  (50%). Although  it may  serve  the traditionally  postulated  holding  pattern or safety  net
for the latter, the data are consistent  with  it being  a desirable  sector  in itself As a first approximation
it may  be more correct to assume  that small  scale  LDC firms  have  origins  and dynamics  similar  to
l/(1-Pj).
18  Although  matching  workers  on multiple  characteristics  in the construction  of  the panels guards  against
record  substitutions  that would  appear  as transitions,  two  additional  attempts  were made  to test the robustness
of the results  from the "protected"  sample,  neither  of which  can claim  more  validity  than the raw  transitions
themselves.  The first tabulated  the transitions  that occur  in  the third quarter  if all other  quarters  are identical,
assumes  that these represent miscodings,  and corrects  the matrix accordingly.  The second looks only  at
"confirmed"  transitions  where  the initial  and final positions  were  recorded  twice  consecutively.  By treating
even  legitimate  rapid  turnovers  as coding  errors,  both adjustment  methods  necessarily  impart  an upward  bias
to the tenure  estimates  and they  do  increase  in all sectors.  However,  in neither  case do  the rankings  of sectors
by turnover  or the symmetries  of the IRM change  substantially.  Results  available  on request.
19  The one exception  is from Infonnal Salaried  to Formal  Salaried  in the Micro-enterprise  sample  where
the overall impact of Exp and Exp squared evaluated  at the mean experience  level is positive,  but not
significant.  Gregory  (1986) analyzing  Mexican  data from 1940-1980  also  finds no evidence  of queuing  to
enter the formal sector "The empirical  evidence...represents  the antithesis  of the Todaro [dualist]  model.
Rather than flowing into a queue to await the opening of improved  employment  opportunities,  migrants
moved  quickly  and easily into employment  opportunities  in both  the formal  and informal  sectors..."  p. 267
14their industrial country counterparts, rather than being a distinct phenomenon. 20
First, the motivational responses from the joint NUES/MES panel discussed earlier (table 3)
show that at least two-thirds of those entering self employment from fornal  salaried employment
report moving voluntarily, with a desire for greater independence or higher pay cited as the principal
motives. This percentage remains relatively unchanged even when the sample is restricted to those
previously working in firms over 50 employees (available  on request).2 "  These results are very close
to Gottshalk and Maloney's (1985) finding that roughly 70% of U.S. job changes are voluntary. Put
differently, if self-employment  and, arguably contract work given  the common earnings differentials,
are close substitutes for formal salaried  work, the implied rates of involuntary entry would be normal
by U.S. standards.
The motivational reports are corroborated by the transitional  evidence  as well. Turnover rates,
(and implicit tenure at 3.7 years) are far closer to those in the formnal  sector as would be expected
from a destination sector than for the other two informal sectors. As in the U.S., self-employment
is not an entry occupation from school  (Aronson 1991) and there is little evidence that the sector
serves as a holding pattern for young workers. The V values from school are only a fifth, and from
unemployment about half, of those  entering formal salaried employment.  Transitions into self-
employment from the other paid sectors  occur 4 to 6 years later than transitions  into the other
20  See  Levenson  and  Maloney  (1997)  for a discussion  of alternative  conceptions  of LDC  small  firms,
their dynamics,  and  their  decisions  to become  "formal."
21 They  are  also  supportive  of  Balhn  et  al.'s  finding  that  being  one's  own  boss  was  well-regarded  and  that
movements  into  self-employment  from  salaried  positions  often  represented  an improvement  in  job status  Of
those  moves  from  formal  into  self-employment  they  studied,  57%  were  to upward  moves  in job quality,  30%
horizontal  (which  the  authors  argue  is considered  welfare  improving  because  of  the  greater  independence),
and 11%  downward  (which  also  could  also  be welfare  improving  eg.,  a supervisor  who  buys  a grocery  store
may  still  consider  himself  better  off).
15alternatives, including formal salaried work (table 1), leaving the mean age 8 years higher than the
next closest sector. From every paid sector, the logit results reveal that the probability  of moving into
self-employment relative to not moving at all is associated with greater experience, and (with the
exception of contract  work) higher real wages. These patterns, and Balan et  al's  longitudinal
interviews, are supportive  of the recent industrialized country literature on liquidity constraints,
(exacerbated  in the LDC  context), that dictate a threshold level of financial and human capital
necessary to  start  a business that  can only be  accumulated with time  and work  as  a  salaried
employee."
As in the U.S., self-employment  for some workers may serve as a form of partial retirement,
but it is unlikely that the sector serves primarily this purpose, or as a safety net for laid off older
workers who are unable to find new salaried  jobs.  First, the decreasing quadratic term on experience
(with the exception of the contract sector for which it was never significant)  implies that the influence
of experience on the probability of moving into the self-employed sector increases at a decreasing
rate, a result consistent with the findings of Brock, Evans, and Phillips (1986) for the U.S..  Further,
though there is perhaps some weak evidence from the likelihood ratios on the formal/self-employed
transition that those involuntarily  leaving their previous  job were more likely to end up self-employed
than to stay formal, the reverse dynamic appears as strong: the significant  likelihood and Z statistics
on the involuntary interactive terms on the self-employed/formal  transition suggest a safety net role
22  See  Evans  and  Jovanovic  (1989),  Aronson  (1991)  p 23.  Balan  et al.  argue  that "First,  the man  must
accumulate  capital.  This  is no  easy  matter  when  he has a manual  job and  must  provide  for  a large  family,  so
it generally  takes  years  to accumulate  enough  capital.  There  must  be sufficient  funds  not only  to set up the
business,  but also  to keep  it going  during  the  months  or  years  while  it runs  at  a deficit  ..these  kinds  of capital
requirements  are  modest  enough,  but  the capital  is not easy  to come  by  for  the  working  classes  of  Monterrey
or elsewhere  in Mexico.  " p. 217. As with  Evans  and Leighton,  they  find  that the  percentage  of workers
entering  self-  employment  was  roughly  constant  across  age  cohorts.
16played by the formal sector for failed entrepreneurs. The fact that, regardless of destination, the less-
experienced are more likely to leave is in line with the mainstream literature on firm dynamics that
younger firms (on average also less experienced workers) have higher failure rates.'
But what would compel workers to give up the ostensibly  large benefits in the formal sector?
First, it may be that the decision process of the self-employed  is not fundamentally  different from that
of their counterparts  in the industrialized countries who also take on responsibility for medical
insurance, or saving for retirement that was previously covered by their employers.  Second, since
the cost of benefits to employers reduces the wage component of formal sector remuneration,  a
perceived value below that cost as suggested by section II will lead workers to seek out jobs in the
unregulated sector where remuneration is entirely  monetary. Third, Balan et. al.'s  interviews suggest
that the very legislation that is thought to induce rigidities  into the labor market in fact stimulates such
turnover  and  encourages workers to  leave salaried employment. The paucity of  openings for
promotion on the rigid "escalafon"  as well as the ceiling  on mobility  opportunities for manual workers
makes self-employment the remaining outlet for further advancement. These last two issues suggest
that, in contrast to the usual view, the extant labor protections may make formal sector work less
desirable, rather than less attainable.
This logic, which applies to all three informal sectors, is most compelling where small scale
firms can offer remuneration comparable to that earned in the formal sector- among low education
workers, unlikely to generate much firm specific capital. This is supported by the logit results that
workers become less likely to leave formal employment for self-employment, or any other informal
sector, as their education level increases. As the opportunity cost of being one's own boss rises with
23 See Jovanovic (1982), Evans and Leighton (1989).
17formal sector labor productivity, we may see a decline in the share of the labor force self-employed
from its present levels.
ii. Contract work
The data cannot approach the level of institutional detail offered in the many case studies on
this sub-sector (see f.n. 3) nor can the brief period examined  establish whether contract work is the
result of a process of deregulating activities that were previously regulated. However, its relatively
small share of informal production (20%) suggests that it is probably incorrect to generalize sub-
contracting relations to the informal sector as a whole.  Further, the similarities to self-employment
suggest that common motivations may underlie a worker's decision  to engage in sub-contracting, and
that the sector may not represent inferior work.
First, there is no characteristic that raises the probability  of leaving  contract work for salaried
formal work as opposed to staying and the Vs are symmetrical:  there seems to be little evidence of
uni-directional graduation from contract work to formal salaried work. Nor is there strong evidence
that movements into the sector are involuntary. The similarities of the self-employed and contract
earnings differentials in section II suggested the possibility of similar motivations for entry into the
sector  and there is even less evidence from the logit regressions of involuntary movement: the
involuntary dummy is significant at the 9% level in the "unprotected" sample only and of the wrong
sign on  the intercept  although increasing with  schooling. As with  self-employment, the  logit
regressions show a positive, although insignificant,  joint influence of the experience terms on entry
from informal salaried employment. The fact that thejoint impact of the experience terms is negative
coming from formal salaried employment where for entry into self-employment it is positive may
18suggest that the accumulation of capital is less necessary where the subcontracting firm provides
needed inputs.
Given that those who move to contract work from formal salaried employment are, again,
those with less education, it is possible that the low skilled  laborer who prefers more independence,
or who thinks he could do better on commission  than in the factory, voluntarily moves to contract
work.  The differentials between costs to firms and value to workers of benefits discussed in section
II offer a benign interpretation of informal subcontracting as a way of reducing firm costs: it becomes
a Pareto improving trade where contract workers gain the value of  benefits while firms' non-wage
labor costs fall. Roberts'(1989)  Guadalajara interviews suggest that given the very weak unions and
low wages, informalization is not primarily  a strategy for reducing remuneration and worker control
over production: "Market uncertainty and the large number  of income opportunities in the city mean
that it is useful for both employees and employers  to have flexibility  in allocating labor."(italics added,
p. 48). This may explain the high turnover in the sector.  Since the matrices suggest that contract
workers are less likely to become unemployed, leave the labor force, go to school or become unpaid
than other workers, turnover  seems unrelated to instability  of employment in itself  Workers may
in fact be redefining themselves with rapid shifts in clientele:  a self-employed  worker who takes on
a short term contract will suddenly appear to shift sectors.
More generally, it is possible that sub-.contracting  is not so much a way of avoiding labor
legislation, as avoiding the inefficiencies in it. Given the political difficulties of taking  on the
anachronisms in the  70 year old  labor code,  sub-contracting may represent  less  a threat  to
industrialized country worker protections, than a means  to induce  the flexibility  necessary  in a modem
open economy that the data suggests is not obviously detrimental  to the workers involved.
19iii. Informal salaried employment and entry into work.
Even if the self-employed  benefit from being their own bosses, the mainstream view is that
those who work for them are the very worst off of the urban workforce: salaried, yet without
benefits. However,  rather than being  a stagnant  group of disadvantaged  workers, the sector appears
to serve primarily as the principal, although not exclusive, port of entry for young, poorly educated
workers into paid employment. The mean age of 29 is 5 years below that of formal sector  and
contract workers and 14 years below that of the self-employed. The transition matrices show a
cluster of high mobility between school, unpaid work and, to a lesser extent, unemployment that
suggests a pool of workers not yet tracked into regular  employment. Those leaving school and those
unemployed show disproportionate movement into unpaid labor (and, to a lesser extent, infornal
salaried work). The extremely high Vs between school and unpaid work suggest intermittent work
at home, or perhaps an apprenticeship before schooling is completed.
Subsequently  unpaid workers move disproportionately into the informal salaried sector. This
suggests that while and just  after completing school, many help out at the family business, and
eventually get paid.  They spend on average only 2 years doing this before moving on to other paid
work.  The brevity of tenure is the same as that found in Brazil by Sedlacek et. al. and is similar to
the U.S. where the median tenure for young workers 16 to 24 years of age is only 1.4 years and 25
to 34, 3.4 years. 24 Even if this pattern of graduation from school to unpaid to informal salaried  work
to other modes of work may represent the queuing that the dualistic  literature might predict, the wait
in informal salaried work is not long.
24BLS  News,  USDL 92-386  for 1991.
20However,  if Hemmner  and Mannel  (1989)  are correct that in many  countries  informal  small
enterprises  train more apprentices  and workers  than the formal  education  system  and the mostly
government  job-training  schemes  together, these years to large degree may  constitute  continued
schooling.  Further,  the symmetry  of the flows  back  into informal  salaried  employment  from all  three
of the other sectors suggests  that the opportunities  there are not considered  uniformly  worse than
those in the other sectors.  The logit results suggest that from every sector, entering  workers are
those  with  less experience,  less  schooling  and  lower  initial  wages. Balan  et al (1973  p. 132)  provide
one possible  explanation: "The  first years  in the labor force are ones for learning  skills,  'shopping
around,'  exploring  alternatives...  Very few men... held at age 25 the same  job they had ten years
earlier."  The concentration  among  the very  poor and  uneducated  again  suggests  the low opportunity
cost of leaving  formal  sector  employment.  The  better  educated  who push  up the mean  for schooling
and wages in the formal  sector (table 1), and who the logit results  suggest  are more likely  to enter
formnal  sector employment,  may  not  consider  salaried  employment  in the informal  sector  comparable,
but those working menial  or assembly  line  jobs at less  well paying  formal sector firms may. The
evidence  that the sector is a safety  net for forrnal  salaried  unemployed  is mixed. The likelihood  on
involuntary  terms is significant  only  in the unprotected  sample,  but the intercept  dummy  suggests  a
lower probability of entering informal  salaried  employment  if involuntarily  separated with the
probability  increasing  with experience.
VL Conclusions
This  paper  offers  an alternative  to the traditional  dualistic  view of the interaction  between  the
formal  and  informal  sectors  and  some  supportivle  evidence  from  observed  patterns  oftransition  among
21them. It argues  that there are good reasons  for workers  to prefer  informal  employment,  both due to
the relatively  low levels  of human  capital,  and the inefficiencies  in the present  labor codes.
This does  not preclude  institutional  rigidities  from  accounting  for some  fraction  ofthe sector,
particularly  during  cyclical  downturns.  The period examined  here  was a relatively  prosperous  one
where  minimum  wages  were not binding.  Nor does it rule out efficiency  wage  arguments  as accurate
descriptions  of a subsegment  of the formal  work force. It is possible  that the market is dualistic  in
the sense  used in th  industrialized  world,  but that the good  job/bad  job division  cuts across  issues
of formality. Further,  this view does not deny the possibility  of exploitive  relations arising  from
subcontracting,  despite  its plausible  benefits  to both parties.
But, much  of the informal  sector  is likely  to persist  even  in the absence  of these  effects.  Both
earnings  differentials  and patterns of mobility  are consistent  with much  of the informal  sector being
a desirable  destination  and with the distinct modalities  of work being relatively  well integrated.
There is little evidence  to support the traditional  dualistic  view as the principal  paradigm  through
which  informality  should  be viewed.
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25Table 1: Mean Age, Experlence,  Schooli,  a  Indial  Real  Wae
Mexico  Nadonal Urban Employment  Srvey,  1991-92
Unprotcted  (U) and Mioentre  (M)  definitos
Transiton
InriA/tl  -nal.  Def  Nobh  Age  Experence  School  Rwage
FonnalSalrled/FonnalSauaried  U  4168  34.1  20.7  7.36  100.0
(0.19)  (0.21)  (0.04)  (0.10)
M  4421  33.8  20.4  7.35  101.2
(0.18)  (0.20)  (0.04)  (0.10)
Self  Employed/Fdoal  Salaried  U  264  37.0  24.6  6.39  124.2
(0.75)  (0.83)  (0.60)  (0.61)
M  301  36.3  23.8  6.47  121.7
(0.66)  (0,73)  (0.17)  (0.57)
Informal  Salaried/Fomd Salaried  U  315  2S.7  16.0  6.66  70.3
(0.70)  (0.79)  (0.16)  (0.23)
M  3S8  29.9  17.2  6.65  77.8
(0.63)  (0.72)  (0.15)  (0.24)
Contract/Fornal  Salaried  U  192  34.2  21.9  6.28  148.2
(0.80)  (0.90)  (0.21)  (1.46)
M  241  34.3  22.1  6.17  146.4
(0.77)  (0.86)  (0.19)  (1.29)
Sdf Employed/Self  Employed  U  1793  43.1  31.6  5.52  136.4
(0.28)  (0.32)  (0.08)  (0.59)
M  1812  43.1  31.6  5.50  131.0
(0.28)  (0.32)  (0.07)  (0.56)
Infonnal  Salaried/Self  Employed  U  212  34.7  23.3  5.41  74.6
(0.89)  (1.01)  (0.21)  (0.28)
M  209  35.0  23.2  5.75  78.5
(0.7)  (0.99)  (0.21)  (0.31)
Fonmal  Salaried/Self  Employed  U  270  36.2  23.7  6.56  106.8
(0.68)  (0.78)  (0.18)  (0.52)
M  320  36.4  24.1  6.27  106.4
(0.64)  (0.72)  (0.17)  (0.50)
Contract/Self  Employed  U  125  39.4  27.5  5.91  121.4
(1.19)  (1.35)  (0.28)  (0.86)
M  133  39.1  27.2  5.93  121.0
(1.15)  (1.30)  (0.27)  (0.81)
Stndard ers  in 0. Age,  Employmet  Expence,  Sdiooling  in yar,  Rwa=iitial  real  wage  with  formal  sector  wage  as base.
Transitions  correspond  to initial  and  final  positions  arm  a five  qustr  perod. Fomai  is definod  i  two  ways:
Unprotcted (U) - firms  of under 16  total  workers  not coved  by medical  or social  security  beefit;  Microenterprise  (M)'
firma  under  6 total workes  Self-employed- owners of informal finns  Salaied informal-  workes  in informal firms
Contract workers  unsalaned workers on piecewort, or other contrTable 1 (conL)
Trunsulon
lirtslaFbIu  Def  Nobs  Age  Experience  School  Rwage
Infornal Salbued/Ifonf al Salbried  U  529  29.0  16.9  6.11  69.8
(0.54)  (0.61)  (0.13)  (0.19)
M  581  30.4  18.1  6.34  68.7
(0.51)  (0.58)  (0.12)  (0.16)
Self Employed/Infonnal  Salaried  U  242  37.4  26.1  5.31  94.2
(0.S6)  (0.96)  (0.20)  (0.37)
M  244  37.7  26.5  5.23  97.6
(0.88)  (0.99)  (0.20)  (0.46)
Formal  Salaried/Informal  Salaried  U  308  29.6  17.0  6.62  87.2
(0.67)  (0.77)  (0.16)  (0.26)
M  391  29.2  17.3  6.56  85.8
(0.62)  (0.70)  (0.15)  (0.27)
Contract/WIormal  Salaried  U  116  34.3  22.7  5.59  101.8
(1.23)  (1.38)  (0.28)  (0.92)
M  94  34.4  22.9  5.51  102.9
(1.22)  (1.43)  (0.32)  (1.10)
ContracttContract  U  439  -35.2  23.0  6.18  132.7
(0.59)  (0.66)  (0.15)  (0.45)
M  439  35.3  23.0  6.23  131.1
(0.59)  (0.66)  (0.15)  (0.45)
Self  Employed/Contract  U  149  37.3  25.2  6.09  134.6
(0.96)  (1.08)  (0.24)  (0.74)
M  146  37.0  24.9  6.15  133.6
(0.97)  (1.08)  (0.24)  (0.73)
Ifdormal  Salaried/Contract  U  93  29.4  17.2  6.15  104.5
(1.19)  (1.31)  (0.32)  (1.78)
M  88  29.2  16.7  6.53  105.7
(1.12)  (1.30)  (0.34)  (1.84)
Fomal Salaried/Contract  U  212  31.5  18.7  6.87  111.3
(0.67)  (0.76)  (0.19)  (0.50)
M  245  31.7  19.0  6.64  110.2
(0.65)  (0.72)  (0.I8)  (0.49)
Standard  eiror in 0. Age,  Employment  Experience,  Schooling  in years,  Rwageinitial  real  wage  with  formal  sector  wage  as base.
Traitions  correspond  to initial nd final  poiions  crss  a five  qu  ater period. Formality  is defined  in  two  ways:
Unpotcted (U) = fims of under 16  toal workes not  coverd  by medical  or social  security  benefits;  Micrentaprie  (M)=
firms  under  6 total workes Selff-employed-  owners  of infal  firms.  Salaried  informal-  worcers  in infirmal irms.
Coract  workers  - unsalaued  wokers on  piecwork,  or odher  codracTable 2a: Real Wage Differentials During Transitions
Informal Defined  as Unprotected
Transition  --Real Wage---  --Net Tax-  --Per Hour--  -Hours-
Initial/Final  Nobs  Mean  Rob  Med  Rob  Med  Rob  Med  Rob  Med
Self Employed/Self  Employed  1793  -4.9S  -1.02  -4.09  -1.02  -4.09  1.03  -3.70  -4.78  0.00
(0.70)  (1.56)  (0.70)  (1.53)  (0.62)  (2.67)  (4.95)  (0.00)
Informal  Salaried/Informal  Salaried  529  0.63  1.24  2.72  2.06  2.72  0.77  -1.24  0.51  0.00
(0.74)  (2.83)  (1.21)  (1.56)  (0.42)  (0.65)  (0.54)  (0.00)
Formal Salaried/Formal Salaried  4168  7.95  5.59  4.42  7.64  6.45  8.02  6.69  -0.06  0.00
(9.44)  (5.27)  (12.98)  (9.27)  (11.94)  (9.58)  (0.27)  (0.00)
Contract/Contract  439  3.09  2.50  -0.13  2.50  -0.13  1.29  -0.20  -0.50  0.00
(1.07)  (0.05)  (1.07)  (0.04)  (0.54)  (0.05)  (0.40)  (0.00)
Self Employed-Informal  Salaried  242  -24.38  -19.16  -19.22  -19.82  -19.70  -20.42  -21.53  -5.14  0.00
(6.87)  (4.93)  (7.17)  (5.10)  (6.73)  (4.81)  (2.28)  (0.00)
Informal  Salaried/Self  Employed  212  22.83  17.72  16.04  19.83  16.04  24.82  22.28  -10.54  -6.25
(3.69)  (1.95)  (4.08)  (3.63)  (4.87)  (3.41)  (3.91)  (1.78)
SelfEmployed/Formal  Salaried  264  -10.90  1.41  0.64  -3.29  -3.92  -13.39  -13.32  -0.63  0.00
(0.39)  (0.18)  (0.95)  (0.67)  (3.93)  (4.62)  (0.32)  (0.00)
Formal Salaried/Self  Employed  270  16.71  8.33  0.53  14.99  6.18  27.27  23.63  -5.52  -4.17
(2.14)  (0.15)  (3.63)  (1.41)  (5.91)  (7.24)  (3.02)  (1.44)
Informal  Salaried/Formal Salaried  315  19.45  20.31  17.71  18.24  15.81  17.52  14.18  -0.23  0.00
(7.24)  (4.40)  (6.75)  (5.13)  (6.26)  (5.41)  (0.22)  (0.00)
Adjusted by Firm Size  13.60  14.41  12.62  12.95  9.01  11.69  7.55
(5.49)  (4.51)  (5.06)  (3.78)  (4.39)  (2.28)
Formal  Salaried/Informal Salaried  308  -12.04  -7.96  -9.41  -5.22  -6.26  -2.08  -3.74  -0.32  0.00
(3.31)  (5.28)  (2.13)  (2.30)  (0.87)  (1.45)  (0.29)  (0.00)
Adjusted by Firm Size  -7.82  -3.88  -5.07  -0.25  -1.16  2.94  2.48
(1.53)  (1.26)  (0.10)  (0.39)  (1.13)  (0.87)
Contract/SelfEmployed  125  20.95  6.08  8.43  6.08  8.43  13.18  11.90  -7.09  -217
(1.25)  (1.13)  (1.25)  (1.45)  (2.18)  (1.43)  (2.14)  (0.70)
Self Employed/Contract  149  -7.95  -4.98  -9.91  -4.98  -9.91  -6.74  -12.97  -2.06  0.00
(1.08)  (1.62)  (1.08)  (1.60)  (1.42)  (1.91)  (0.62)  (0.00)
Infornal Salaried/Contract  93  -3.76  16.98  7.90  20.84  12.81  25.19  18.77  3.63  4.17
(2.74)  (0.72)  (3.31)  (2.48)  (3.53)  (1.38)  (1.22)  (1.48)
Contrac  Informal Salaried  116  -16.66  .10.61  -13.68  -12.08  -13.68  -5.67  -5.83  .6.35  2.17
(2.83)  (2.66)  (3.29)  (2.44)  (1.24)  (0.89)  (2.83)  (1.17)
Formal Salaried/Contract  212  11.40  18.16  16.43  25.36  23.51  19.79  14.85  4.11  0.00
(4.57)  (4.86)  (6.13)  (5.83)  (4.69)  (3.59)  (3.00)  (0.00)
Contract/Formal Salaried  192  -17.60  -7.70  -13.68  -13.12  -16.26  -15.81  -14.19  -0.80  0.00
(2.23)  (3.05)  (4.11)  (3.71)  (4.99)  (5.02)  (0.47)  (0.00)
Notes: "t"  statistics beneath coefficient.  "Real  Wage" =real wage differential  in O* "Net Tax =diffrrential net of taxes.
"Per  Hour"=differential  in net wage/hours  worked;"Hours"=diffcrential  in hours  worked.  "Mean"=average  differential
weighted by  initial  real wage to give differential  between  sampile  "Rob"=robust  men  using  Huber weights to redress
non-normality ;"Med"  = median from quantile  regression  using  bootstrapped  standard  efors.Table 2b: Redl Wage Differeuntil  During TrnsltIons
Infofmal Defined  as Mieroentepise
Transilden  -Real  Wage-  -Net  Tax-  -Per  Hour-  -Hours-
InltlUFnbl  Nobs  Mean  Rob  Med  Rob  Med  Rob  Med  Rob  Med
Self Employed/Self  Employed  1812  -5.35  -1.31  -4.21  -1.31  -4.21  0.98  -4.09  -1.63  0.00
(0.91)  (1.60)  (0.91)  (1.60)  (0.60)  (2.04)  (2.26)  (0.00)
Informal Salaried/Infomal Salaried  581  -0.13  2.65  2.72  2.65  2.72  1.87  -0.36  0.83  0.00
(1.64)  (2.01)  (1.64)  (2.01)  (1.15)  (0.16)  (1.27)  (0.00)
Famal  Salaried/Formal Salaried  -4421  6.84  5.28  4.02  7.26  6.35  7.53  6.42  0.42  0.00
(8.95)  (8.32)  (12.44)  (8.64)  (11.31)  (8.60)  (2.54)  (0.00)
Contract/Contract  439  3.09  2.50  -0.13  2.50  -0.13  1.29  -0.20  0.17  0.00
(1.07)  (0.04)  (1.07)  (0.04)  (0.54)  (0.08)  (0.16)  (0.00)
Self  Employed-Informal  Salaried  244  -26.41  -20.53  -22.31  -20.53  -22.31  -20.76  -22.31  40.89  0.00
(7.41)  (5.31)  (7.41)  (5.31)  (7.05)  (5.01)  (0.56)  (0.00)
Ifomal  Salaried/Self  Employed  209  27.05  18.87  16.04  18.87  16.04  23.30  22.28  -3.37  -1.64
(3.92)  (2.93)  (3.92)  (2.93)  (4.66)  (3.88)  (1.78)  (0.57)
SelfEmployed/Formal Salatied  301  -13.47  -0.71  -0.90  -6.15  -7.84  -13.59  -13.02  3.77  0.00
(0.21)  (0.16)  (1.94)  (1.55)  (4.17)  (2.83)  (1.90)  (0.00)
Formal Salaried/Self  Employed  320  17.66  8.69  3.96  16.63  11.82  27.61  24.51  -3.55  0.00
(2.41)  (0.74)  (4.36)  (2.36)  (6.48)  (5.95)  (2.27)  (0.00)
Informal SalariedFormalSalaried  388  19.25  14.40  11.28  8.78  5.16  8.71  6.75  0.12  0.00
(5.74)  (3.11)  (3.70)  (1.70)  (3.52)  (1.71)  (0.19)  (0.00)
Adjusted by Firm Size  10.58  6.05  5.45  OA9  0.87  0.85  -1.98
(2.64)  (1.67)  (0.23)  (0.41)  0.38  (0.79)
Fornal Salaried/Informal Salaried  391  -3.92  -1.91  -2.89  5.06  3.87  6.14  1.68  0.99  0.00
(0.89)  (1.03)  (2.22)  (1.42)  (2.57)  (0.60)  (1.36)  (0.00)
A4justed byFirm Size  3.11  5.23  5.33  13.41  12.79  15.09  11.98
(2.26)  (2.31)  (5.42)  (5.44)  (5.78)  (3.40)
Contract/Self  Employed  133  17.00  6.95  8.43  6.95  8.43  14.29  11.92  -2.91  0.00
(1.45)  (1.18)  (1.45)  (1.18)  (2.44)  (1.94)  1.13  (0.00)
SelfEmployed/Contract  146  -5.21  -3.63  -7.28  -3.63  -7.28  -7.57  -13.68  2.72  0.00
(0.77)  (1.56)  (0.77)  (1.56)  (1.64)  (2.02)  1.00  (0.00)
informal Salaried/Contract  88  -3.86  15.08  7.90  15.08  7.90  19.61  15.15  1.88  3.28
(2.46)  (0.87)  (2.46)  (0.87)  (2.81)  (1.35)  (0.95)  (1.59)
ContractVInformal  Salaried  94  -19.69  -12.68  -13.68  -12.68  -13.68  -6.29  -4.95  -1.82  0.00
(3.37)  (2.76)  (3.37)  (2.76)  (1.24)  (0.88)  (0.88)  (0.00)
Formal SaiedContrat  .-  245  IZ89  18.94  15.92  27.84  24.70  22.60  14.90  3.82  1.64
(4.78)  (4.01)  (6.69)  (6.26)  (5.33)  (3.28)  (3.73)  (1.05)
Contrat/Formal  Salaried  241  -18.66  -7.13  -13.68  -12.87  -17.62  -14.07  -14.19  0.07  0.00
(2.19)  (3.48)  (4.31)  (4.60)  (4.78)  (4.56)  (0.06)  (0.00)
Notes:  "t" atatistics  beneth  coefficinL "Real Wage" -ri  wage  differential  in f;  "Nct  Tax =differential  nct of taxes.
'Per Hour"-differential in not wagehoun  woiked"Houns-differntial  in hours  worked.  "Mean"=average  differential
weighted by  initial  real wage to give  differmtial between  sample.  'Rob"robust  mean using Huber  weights  to redess
non-nomality  ;"Med" - median fizm quantile  rgesicn  using boottrapped standard  erms.Table 3: Real  Wage Differentilrs NUES/MES  Panel
Destiaon  Sector Self-Employment
-Real Wage-  -Net Tax-  -Net K Costs-  Per Worker Hr  -Hours-
Sector of Origin  Nobs  Rob  Med  Rob  Med  Rob  Med  Rob  Med  Rob  Med
Infornnd Salarled  139  33.17  25.60  30.26  25.60  25.36  22.09  18.30  10.63  5.52  8.33
(4.54)  (3.59)  (4.27)  (4.15)  (3.57)  (2.70)  (2.58)  (2.26)  (1.43)  (2.78)
Contract  Work  125  9.83  -0.77  7.76  -0.77  -0.77  -10.45  -3.74  -7.63  -0.04  2.27
1.57  (0.08)  (1.27)  (0.06)  (0.13)  (1.13)  (0.60)  (0.70)  (0.00)  (0.66)
Formua Salared  192  10.97  5.35  17.21  11.36  14.85  10.73  12.63  10.01  -1.91  2.00
(2.20)  (1.34)  (3.31)  (1.51)  (2.86)  (2.15)  (2.16)  (1.96)  (0.52)  (0.88)
Reason Left Previous Fonnal  Salaried Job  (Exclusive Response)
More Independence  67  20.16  12.88  27.14  17.80  24.57  16.05  21.59  19.64  -4.61  0.00
35%  (2.22)  (1.60)  (2.90)  (7.14)  (2.66)  (1.65)  (2.16)  (1.66)  (0.88)  (0.00)
HEigherPay  62  19.25  13.48  25.54  18.94  24.50  18.92  16.74  12.09  6.15  12.00
32%  (2.19)  (0.79)  (2.82)  (1.34)  (2.73)  (0.91)  (1.57)  (1.25)  (0.96)  (1.82)
Involuntary  55  S.76  -5.42  -2.64  0.07  -5.08  -3.83  -2.59  -14.66  -4.09  9.09
29%  (1.13)  (0.44)  (0.32)  (0.00)  (0.60)  (0.34)  (0.24)  (0.95)  (0.51)  (1.17)
Reason for Starting  Micro  -Enterprise  (Multiple Response)
To be Independent  120  8.94  8.66  14.61  14.66  14.04  13.89  3.61  12.85  -3.57  2.00
(1.40)  (3.27)  (2.19)  (3.00)  (2.13)  (1.90)  (0.51)  (1.36)  (0.75)  (0.38)
Higher Pay  63  22.45  17.68  30.94  28.11  28.17  27.80  21.25  18.82  3.53  5.00
(3.06)  (1.65)  (4.10)  (2.88)  (3.79)  (3.70)  (2.82)  (2.53)  (0.66)  (1.53)
Firetor  Unable  38  -11.93  -8.83  -6.88  -3.73  -7.72  -7.35  -18.15  -19.94  9.44  11.11
to FindOther Work  (1.51)  (0.94)  (0.83)  (0.28)  (0.96)  (0.72)  (1.78)  (1.82)  (1.32)  (1.59)
Tradition  12  32.45  22.50  28.32  24.32  22.21  24.14  9.48  -8.64  18.27  24.07
(1.40)  (0.56)  (1.42)  (0.62)  (0.82)  (0.49)  (0.28)  (0.22)  (2.11)  (1.82)
Notes: Y  statiics  beneath coefficiet.  "Real Wage"  -real wage differential in °h; "Net  Tax =differential  net oftaxes.
-Net K Costs"- tax adjusted differential net of capital costs imputed at 10% of sum of value of tools, inventories, and location if ownedL
"Per Worker Hour-=capital cost and tax adjusted  differential adjusted for total hours worked by all workers including those unpaid;
"Housse  differental  in hours worked by princpal worker. "Rob"=robust mean using Huber weights  to redress  non-normalty.
'Mod'  = median fiom quantile regession  using bootstrapped  standard erors.Table 4a: Worker Characterstics Affecting Sectoral Transitions Across Five Quarters
Multinomal  Logit,  Informal  Dellied - Unprotected
loitlal Sector. Self  Empoyed  -votay  Interactive  Te.a  n  LR
Fnal:  C  Exp V  Exp2  School Rwage,  Invol  Exp  Exp2  School Rwage chi2(5)
Ifonndal  Salaied  1.09  -0.10  1.02E-03  .4.11  -17.54-  25.45  -0.40  -1.99E-02  .2.96  155.16  26.07
(2.88)  (5.14)  (3.19)  (3.38)  (4.2S):! (2.08)  (0.87)  (1.39)  (1.97)  (1.20)  [0.00]
Formal  Salaried  -0.53  -0.06  4.24E-04  0.00  -1.36.  5.70  -0.15  8.86E-04  .0.34  0.70  10.35
(1.58)  (2.98)  (1.24)  (0.09)  (0.87).  (2.13)  (1.28)  (0.44)  (1.39)  (0.03)  [0.07]
Contract  .0.90  -0.05  2.20E-04  .0.04  -0.25!  -1.03  -0.16  3.22E-03  0.20  8.17  1.52
(1.94)  (2.08)  (0.50)  (1.22)  (0.19).  (0.23)  (0.93)  (1.06)  (0.46)  (0.19)  (0.91]
Number  of obs = 2448  chi2(27)  = 211.15  [00]
Pseudo  R2 = 0.0497  Log  Likelhood  = -2018
IniIal  Sector:  Infonus  Salaried  yT  em  s  LR
Fial:  C  Exp I/  Exp2  School Rwage  Invol  Exp  Exp2  School  Rwage chi2(5)
Self  Employed  -2.43  0.10  -1.17E-03  0.04  3.92.  -1.17  0.19  -3.45E-03  0.07  -64.82  2.33
(6.05)  (4.21)  (2.96)  (1.13)  (0.57)  (040)  (1.11)  (1.19)  (0.32)  (0.82)  [0.30]
Fonmal  Salaried  .1.12  -1.72E-03  1.90E-04  0.09  1.0S  1.27  -0.04  1.02E-04  *0.30  42.28  4.68
(3.24)  (0.09)  (0.54)  (2.73)  (0-16). (057)  (0.32)  (0.04)  (1.51)  (1.14)  [0.46]
Contract  .2.93  0.05  -8.51E-04  0.04  21.66.  5.24  -0.08  -3.19E-04  -0.41  42.63  6.85
(5.30)  (1.46)  (1.35)  (.71)  (2.97).  (190)  (0.52)  (0.10)  (1.61)  (0.72)  [0.23]
Nnuber of  obs  = 1149  chi2(27) = 89.34  [00]
Paeudo  R2  =  0.0317  Log  Likeliood  = -1365
Initrl  Sector: Formal Saaried  -Involuntary Interactive  Terms-  LR
Fina:  C  Exp 1/  Exp2  School Rwage.  Invol  Exp  Exp2  School Rwage chi2(5)
Self  Employed  -2.87  0.06  -1.02E-03  -0.09  5.59.  1.54  0.01  6.51E-04  0.00  -9.50  35.76
(8.31)  (2.81)  (2.83)  (3.23)  (1.87)! (1.04)  (0.07)  (0.51)  (0.03)  (0.50)  [0.00]
Informal  Salaried  0.62  -0.11  1.10E-03  -0.25  -2.86!  -2.15  0.40  -1.21E-02  0.08  12.46  14.61
(2.05)  (6.45)  (35")  48.81)  (0.61).  (1.20)  (2.17)  (1.94)  (0.48)  (0.49)  [0.01]
Contract  -1.68  0.02  -1.2SE-03  -0.19  10.721  -5.79  0.21  -1.3E-03  0.65  -78  9.46
(4.64)  (0.84)  (2.67)  45.90)  (3.91).  (1.47)  (1.54)  (0.53)  (2.05)  (1.13)  [0.09]
Nunberof obs =  4958  chi2(27) = 256.67[00]
Pseudo  R2 - 0.0423  Log  Likelhood  -2905
Initial  Sector: Contract  n  Terms  LR
Fmal:  C  Exp  1/  Exp2  2/  School Rwage  Inoyal  Exp  Exp2  School  Rwage chi2(5)
Self  Emphyed  -2.09  0.03  0.05  -5.12-  -5.23  0.16  0.50  -37.04  8.29
(4.62)  (2.93)  (1.30)  (1.15).  (1.16)  (1.84)  (1.31)  (0.75)  [0.08]
Informal  Salaried  0.09  -0.01  -0.09  -19.77.  -1.06  0.09  0.28  -65.19  6.61
(0.21)  (1.39)  (1.95)  (2.92).  (0.30)  (1.20)  (0.88)  (1.29)  [0.16]
Formul  Saied  .0.63  -0.01  -0.02  2.82!  -4.79  0.10  0.51  -24.49  1.97
(1.75)  (1.09)  (0.50)  (1.30).  (0.98)  (1.03)  (1.19)  (0.49) [Q074]
Number  of  obs -s 72  chi2(21) - 54.32  [00]
Paeudo  R2  - 0.0254  Log Likelhood - -1042
Notea:  coeffiients of logit  reflect  how  uxpaience,  experience  aquaed  whoolin and the  initial  real wage  affect  the probabiity
of moving  fomthe  nial  sector  to the fal  aector  relative  to the probability  of stayngin the  initial ector. The second  half of each  panel
presens t  r  dmnny and ineactive effect  of inmoluty  separation  from  the previousjob  (tabulated  only  if unemployed  betweenjobs).
re  aaiatis  benth  coefficient  ino; 7P-vaue" in [  ]. Involuntay  interactive  dunmies-1 if involuntarily  sepated  & unemployed.
IR-  Eketlhood sdo  tea ofjoint signiflicane  of  ineai  effects. 1/ Sign  of  compound  value  of 
5xp, Exp2  evluated at mean  is dut of
Exp  wift tdw  exeption of FS to Conact  2/ Exp2  never ignificamt  in Contract  regresions at 10%  and dropped.Table 4b: Worker Characterstics  Affecting Sectoral Transitions Across  Five Quarters
MulUtnomal  Loslt,  Informl Defined a Micro-enterprise
InlIial Sector. Self Employed  -Invohlntary lintrcc  Terms-  LR
Fima:  C  Exp I/  Exp2  School Rwagp  l  nvol  Exp  Exp2  School Rwap  chi2(5)
Infonnal  Salaried  1.27  -0.12  1.34E-03  -0.13  -12.44-  628  9.54  -1.24E+00  -115  5869  24.11
(3.45)  (6.36)  (4.40)  (4.45)  (3.31).  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00]
Fornal Salaried  -0.77  -0.03  -1.91E-04  0.00  .1.68.  7.18  -0.23  2.01E.03  -0.40  0.98  21.62
(2.13)  (1.47)  (0.54)  (0.07)  (0.79).  (2.83)  (2.00)  (1.01)  (1.71)  (0.04)  [0.00]
Contract  0.97  *0.05  1.49E-04  -0.04  -0.09.  -0.92  -0.17  3.39E-03  0.20  9.21  1.55
(2.06)  (1.96)  (0.33)  (1.12)  (0.08)'  (0.21)  (0.97)  (1.10)  (0.47)  (0.21)  [0.911
Numba of obs - 2503  chi2(27)-- 238.341  [00]
Pseudo  R2 -0.0540  Log  Likelihood  - .20S6
Initl  Sector Informal Salaled  -Invohuntarnteracwez  Terms-  LR
Fuial:  C  Exp  I/  Exp2  School Rwagec Invol  Exp  Exp2  School Rwagp chi2(5)
Self  Employed  -2.19  0.06  -6.42E-04  0.01  17.77  -4.S2  0.28  -3.56E-03  0.25 -11.83  4.80
(5.45)  (2.48)  (1.59)  (0.15)  (2.39).  (1.58)  (1.55)  (1.07)  (1.06)  (0.27)  [0.44]
Formal  Salaried  -0.70  -0.04  6.87E-04  0.02  23.53.  5.04  -0.04  -7.97E-05  -0.39  -166  10.51
(2.18)  (2.11)  (2.07)  (0.73)  (3.77).  (1.54)  (0,25)  (0.03)  (1.42)  (1.67)  [0.621
Contact  -2.39  0.01  -5.00E-04  -0.01  34.48,  6.24  -0.16  6.26E-04  -0.33  -114  5.25
(4.63)  (0.38)  (0.74)  (0.18)  (4.49)1 (1.75)  (0.75)  (0.10)  (1.06)  (1.25)  (0.391
Number  of obs  1266  ch2(27) - 90.26[00]
Pseudo  R2  - 0.0296  Log  Likelihood  - -1477
IniUal Secton Formal Salaried  -IInte-lctive  Term-  LR
Fuial:  C  Exp I/  Exp2  School  Rw  I  gesInvol  Exp  Exp2  School Rwage chi2(5)
Scif  Employed  -2.66  0.07  -1.27E-03  .0.12  5.101  1.52  -0.02  1.2SE-03  0.02  -21.23  29.15
(8.64)  (3.79)  (3.84)  (4.90)  (1.89)1 (1.20)  (0.37)  (1.09)  (0.16)  (0.98)  [0.00]
informal  Salaied  0.44  -0.09  9.29E-04  -0.22  -6.341  -0.46  0.05  -4.75E-04  0.05  5.91  8.86
1.70  (6.21)  (3.48)  (S.92)  (1.51).  (0.37)  (0.75)  (0.33)  (0.37)  (0.30)  [0.12]
Contract  -1.66  0.02  *1.22E.03  -0.19  8.98j  -1.48  0.20  -2.851-03  0.12  .56.78  1.86
(5.14)  (1.11)  (2.86)  (6.53)  (3.46)  (0.68)  (1.49)  (0.95)  (0.65)  (1.22)  (0.871
Number  of obs  5377  chi2(27) - 281.92(00]
Pseudo  R2  - 0.0397  Log  Liihood  - .3409
Initial Sector. Contract  t-ncracT  Intivc  Terms-  LR
Final:  C  Exp I/  Exp2 21  School Rwage Invo  EYP  Exp2  School Rwage chi2(5)
Self  Employed  -1.97  0.02  0.05  -5.051 -6.03  0.17  0.54  -29.37  8.29
(1.47)  (2.78)  (1.29)  (1.17)1 (1.29)  (1.90)  (1.39)  (0.62)  [.OS]
Informal  Salaried  -0.01  -0.01  -0.10 -19.341  -6.23  0.16  0.57  -17.49  4.84
(0.01)  (1.43)  (2.05)  (2.63)1 (1.28)  (1.75)  (1.39)  (0.34)  [.30]
Formal  Salaied  -0.33  -0.01  -0.03  2.771  -0.32  0.05  0.23  -72.01  3.72
(0.97)  (1.21)  (0.92)  (1.36)!  (0.09)  (0.71)  (0.71)  (1.52)  [.441
Number  of obs - 907  chi2(21)  - 41.42(00]
Pseudo  R2  - 0.0219  LogLikelihood  - -10S2
Notes:  coeffciens of lobit  rect  how expeience,  expeienc  squred,  schoolin and  the inial real  wage  affect  the probabflity
of  moving  from the iniMiA  er  to the  finl sector  relative  to the  probabTity  of sayn  in the indl  se.  The second  hilf of each  panel
presents  the dummy  and inteuuctive  effect  of involuntazy  separation  from the  preous  job (tabulated  only  if unenployed  between  jobs).
z  stuas  beneat coefficint mO;  T-values' in [ ]. Involuntay  interact1iv  dummies-1  if  molutariy sepated  & unemployed.
1R- likelihood  ratio  tst ofjoint swacance  of intectve  effet.  1/ Sign  of con,pound  value  of  Exp,  Exp2  cvuted  at  man  th t of
Exp  width  the excepion  of PS to Contact. 2/ Exp2  never  sigilcant in Contract  reresions  at 10%  and dropped.Matrix 1: Worker Transitions  Among Sectors of the Labor  Market Across  Five Quarters
Informal Defrned  as Unprotected
Mexico  National Urban Employment  Survey,  1991-1992
Probability of moving from initial  to final sector, Pij, in percent
Final  Sector
Initial Sector  OLF  School  Unemp  Unpaid  SE  IS  FS  Contract  Other  Total
Out of Labor  Force (OLF)  1  7  2  5  1  100
School  2 :  5  6  2  9  17  3  4  100
Unemployed  14  4  2  11  11  26  5  7  100
Unpaid  3  12  MB15  17  10  6  4  100
Self  Employed  (SE)  2  0  2  1  6  100
Informal  Salaried  (IS)  1  2  4  3  _  162  100
Formal  Salaried  (FS)  2  1  3  0  °  }  4  4  100
Contract  1  0  2  0  14  1.  2  . . 5  100
Other  3  2  5  1  21  11  34  7  100
Total(P.j)  6  4  4=-  2  211  11  40  '8  5  100
Pij standardized  by final sector  size, Pij/Pj
Final  Sector
Wftial  Sector  OLF  School  Unernp  Unpaid  SE  iS  FS  Contract  Other
Out of Labor Force  (OLF)  23  172  48  42  22  13  15  41
School  26  128  373  10  88  42  37  70
Unemployed  231  95  97  50  108  66  59  148
Unpaid  55  299  168  nt  s:in>  69  157  25  77  82
Self Employed  (SE)  37  8  53  67  . _  114
formal Salaried  (IS)  25  52  108  200  74  "1  '$  98
Formal  Salaried  (FS)  29  14  68  25  ...  .. ...  71
Contract  24  11  49  17  4  13  101
Other  46  42  13  63  99  107  84  91 
Vij = PijlP.j*(1-Pii)*(l-Pjj)
Final  Sector
Initial  Sector  OLF  School  Unemp  Unpaid  SE  IS  FS  Contract  Other
Out of Labor  Force (OLF) h*@i1>htt  171  767  231  438  126  198  97  175
School  194  i  341  1083  62  303  371  145  177
Unemployed  1029  253  _  166  187  218  347  135  222
Unpaid  265  867  287  ;  277  345  145  190  134
Self Employed  (SE)  383  53  196  272 '2  'i*.........  ;.$  400
Informal  Salaried  (IS)  144  180  218  440  ........  190
Formal  Salaried  (FS)  424  124  35  143  34  52  :::.  10  354
Contract  155  43  i11  41  .."'*'......  219
Other  194  106  201  103  350  206  420  197  s"  l
Notes: Sample  aggregates  three  panels 1990:3-91:3,  1991:1-1992:1,  1991:2-92:2  generating  roughly  15,000  observations.
Includes  male workers,  16-65  with high  school  education  or less in 16  inetropolitian  areas.
Informal  defined  as workers  in firms  under 16 workers  not covered  by medical  or social  security  benefits.  SE,  IS, Contract  are informal.  FS is Formal.
Boxed  cells represent  work,  light shading=paid  work,  darker  shading=probability  of remaining  in same  sector.
By compensating  for final sector  size, Pij/Pj gives  a measure  of fluidity  among  sectors.
By compensating  for rates of tumover  in initial  and final sectors,  Vij givres  a measure  of disposition  (logic)  to move  to a sector.Matrix 2: Worker Transitions Among Sectors of the Labor Market Across Five Quarters
Informal Defined as Micro-enterprise
Mexico  National Urban Employment  Survey,  1991-1992
Probability of moving  from initial to final sector, Pij, in percent
Final  Sector
Inidal Sector  OLF  School  Unemp  Unpaid  SE  IS  FS  Contract  Other  Total
Out  of  Labor  Force  (OLF)  I  6  1  10  3  lo5  1  0  1  100
school  2t1~;3  6  3  9  25  3  0  100
Unemployed  20  4  3  11  11  l 24  5  0  100
Unpaid  3  11  5  16  18  13  6  0  100
Self Employed  (SE)  2  0  2  I  9  .5  1  100
Informal  Salaried  (IS)  2  2  1  3  . 970  1001
Fonnal Salaried  (FS)  1  1  1  7  3  0  100
Contract  1  0  1  0I5l1  2h>4  100
Other  0  0  2  0  26  6  34  6  100
Total(P-j)  5  4  2  2  22  121  45  8  1  100
Pij standardized  by final sector size, Pij/Pj
Final  Sector
Initial Sector  OLF  School  Unemp  Unpaid  SE  IS  FS  Contract  Other
Out of Labor Force  (OLF)  24  321  45  43  23  12  13  15
School  31  155  389  11  77  55  41  13
Unemployed  385  113  . . 161  51  91  53  60  0
Unpaid  61  306  259  72  159  30  77  0
Self Employed  (SE)  41  9  91  71  77  2.  128
Informal  Salaried  (IS)  31  54  60  180  3S
Formal  Salaried  (FS)  26  26  38  30  ~  ~50
Contract  25  12  36  17  s  _  _  59  72
Other  9  0  97  0  115  49  75  73
Vij = PlJ/P.j*(O-Pji)  *(l.-Pj)
Final  Sector
Initial  Sector  OLF  School  Unemnp  Unpaid  SE  is  FS  Contract  Other
Out of Labor  Force (OLF)  180  1551  229  517  145  201  89  79
School  230  394  1050  71  257  498  146  36
Unemployed  1856  287  283  209  199  313  140  0
Unpaid  311  825  454  314  369  185  190  0
Self Employed  (SE)  487  57  374  309  9  _  _  556
Informal  Salaried  (IS)  199  182,  130  41  8  '  tii8349  2  88.
Formnal  Salaried  (FS)  449  234  224  187  312
Contract  172  45  85  41  _  ISO  180
Other  45  0  171  0  500  114  468  1
Notes: Sample  aggregates  three  panels 1990:3-91:3,  1991:1-1992:1,  1991:2-92:2  generating  roughly  15,000  observations.
Includes  male workers,  16-65  with  high school  education  or less in 16  metropolitian  areas.
Informal  defined  as workers  in firms  under 6 workers.  SE,  IS, Contract  are informal.  FS is Formal.
Boxed  cells represent  work, light  shading=paid  work,  darker  shading=probability  of remaining  in same sector.
By compensating  for final sector size, Pij/Pj gives  a measure  of fluidity  among  sectors.
By compensating  for rates  of turnover in  initial  and  final sectors,  Vij gives  a measure  of disposition  (logic)  to move  to a sector.Policy Research Working Paper Series
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